At the turn of the 20th century, DuPont had consolidated most American explosives capacity under its control. It acquired dozens of regional powder and explosive manufacturers, coordinated pricing, allocated market territories and formed an informal explosives trust. Small independent producers were squeezed out through price suppression, raw material control and exclusive dealer agreements. As public criticism of industrial trusts rose nationwide after the Sherman Antitrust Act took effect, DuPont became one of the key targets of federal monopoly investigation.

The core accusation was that DuPont restrained free competition, manipulated blasting powder prices and blocked new entrants from entering the explosives market. Facing official inquiries and congressional hearings, the family did not adopt a purely confrontational strategy. Its legal and elite lobbyists negotiated with regulators, adjusted market coordination methods, and restructured some cross-holding relationships to lower the visibility of monopoly behavior. It spun off a small portion of assets to create seemingly independent competitors, while retaining control over core raw material supply and technical standards.

This first antitrust shock taught DuPont a vital lesson that would shape its strategy for a century afterward. Overt, centralized monopoly was vulnerable to state supervision and public anger. Purely horizontal market control through price cartels was legally risky. In response, the family began to shift its competitive strategy. Instead of simply swallowing all rivals, it prioritized controlling upstream chemical raw materials, core patents and industry technical norms. It also accelerated business diversification away from explosives, preparing alternative profit sources that would not be directly tied to the politically sensitive munitions market. This early antitrust battle marked the beginning of DuPont’s long-running game between monopoly interests and regulatory boundaries.